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Introduction
The Liberation Army of Kosova (Ushtria Çlirirritare e Kosovës,
UÇK) or 'KLA'' has been the best known Albanian rebel movement in
the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. Its most important offshoots
have been the National Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare Kombetare,
UÇK) or 'NLA'2 in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(FYROM)3 and the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujano-
vac {Ushtria Çlirimtare e Presheves, Medvegfes dhe Bujanovcit,
UÇPMB) in southern Serbia. Between 1979 and 2001 most Albanian
rebel groups were bom, grew and withered, though some groups existed
since the 1970s and even earlier. Still the arrival ofthe Kosova Libera-
tion Army surprised Western policymakers. Analysts are uncertain about
the intentions of this rebel movement and its offshoots and political suc-
cessors. This paper contains a structured comparative analysis ofthe two
major Albanian militant formations: KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) and
NLA (National Liberation Army). The analysis presents the Albanian
grievances in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia and critically examines the
origins, structure and success of the two Albanian militant groups. The
analysis ends with an evaluation of the current state of popular griev-
ances and the current state of these two organizations.
The Nature of Albanian Violence
The Albanians nurture a culture of violence well tailored to guer-
rilla i.e. hit-and-run warfare. The mostly Muslim Albanians have a long
history of resistance against powerful rulers and neighbours. Secular
nationalism dominates their thinking since the 1878 League of Prizren
under Abdyl Bey Frashëri called for a unified Albanian state."* Albanians
have had to do without any state until the establishment of Albania in
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1912. Enver Hoxha^ and Sali Berisha« did support Albanian separatists
in Kosovo and FYROM Macedonia. Yet by and large irredentists had to
sustain themselves. Albanian families (shpi), clans (ßs) and political
movements are closely-knit and close-mouthed so as to survive and
sustain underground activities.^ They are only talkative when they feel
safe and in their interest to tell their side of the story.* Albanians have
had few successful 'state builders'. Even their national hero Skanderbeg,
who defeated Ottoman forces from 1443 until his death in 1468, re-
mained a 'mere' rebel chief in his northern Albanian stronghold.'
Socially we can speak of a culture of the gun. Albanians customarily
keep and use weapons for the blood feud, a major part of their Kanun
centred on besa (oath-of-honour), the traditional 'Law of the Mountains'
or 'Kanun of Lek Dukagjin'.'" Albanians have a low threshold to take up
arms for any public or private cause. Albanians frequently use their
weapons to 'settle' property disputes in post-war Kosovo; people are
killed by them." Real and perceived grievances sustain such a propen-
sity to violence. This at times degenerates into violent crime, banditry,
terrorism (violence against civilians) and other humanitarian and human
rights violations.
Grievances of Albanians in Kosovo
The interethnic relations between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo
within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) deteriorated
sharply after the student riots at the University of Pristina on 11 March
1981, nearly a year after the death of Tito. Hundreds of Albanian stu-
dents demanded better living conditions. Thousands of factory workers,
miners and farmers joined the protests, shouting "Kosovo - Republic!"
and "We want a Unified Albania!." Blagoje Nikolic even speaks of a
full-scale "armed rebellion" between April 1 and 3 and a lingering
"separatist insurrection" afterwards.'2 Dissatisfaction with poor living
standards - which became worse during the economic crisis of the 1980s
- translated into radical political demands which separatist groups like
the Group of Marxist-Leninists of Kosova (GMLK) and the Movement
for the National Liberation of Kosova (MNLK) had pursued for years.
The Communist Party Marxist-Leninist of Yugoslavia (PKMLSHJ) and
the Movement for an Albanian Republic in Yugoslavia (LRSHJ) also
edged towards secessionism. These groups joined together to form the
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Popular Movement for the Republic of Kosova (LPRK), despite the
assassination of MNLK-founders Jusuf and Bardhosh Gërvalla and
GMLK-leader Kadri Zeka on 17 January 1982 in Germany.'3 Their
successors Xhafer Shatri and future KLA-leaders like Bardhyl Mahmuti
and Jashar Salihu reportedly uttered a besa to avenge their murdered
compatriots.'^
The Yugoslav authorities accused the LPRK and its predecessors of
having led the protests, and Albania's Enver Hoxha of masterminding
these "Enverists."i5 Belgrade declared a state of emergency and arrested
over two-thousand protesters and alleged organizers. Between 1,200 and
2,000 people received substantial prison sentences.'^ Many officials and
over 1,000 ordinary members of Kosovo's League of Communists were
sacked, expelled and often tried.'7 Xhafer Shatri, Shaban Shala and
many other LPRK members were arrested and jailed. The suppression
cost the lives of eleven people according to Belgrade, one-thousand
people according to Albanians, or up to three-hundred people according
to Amnesty.'* This radicalized sections of the ethnic Albanian commu-
nity in Kosovo. The extremists shared many of their grievances. In spite
of their 'culture of violence' most Kosovar Albanians supported the
policy of peaceful resistance by Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the
Democratic League of Kosova {Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës, LDK)
founded in December 1989 to counteract the rise of Slobodan Milosevic,
who played the nationalist card in order to maintain power.'^ The Serbs
appeared to win the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, and Rugova convinced
his people in 1992 that armed resistance would be folly: "the Serbs only
wait for a pretext to attack the Albanian population and wipe it out. We
believe it is better to do nothing and stay alive than be massacred."2o
On 28 March 1989 Milosevic abolished the autonomous status of
Kosovo and Vojvodina within Serbia which Tito had granted in 1974.2'
This deprived the Kosovar Albanians, by then comprising up to 90% of
Kosovo's two million people, of self-ruling powers and responsibilities.
It constituted a new grievance and ground for revolt. In response the
Democratic League developed an underground government with its own
administration, parliament, and parallel institutions for education, health
care and social benefits. Initially the League called for the creation of an
autonomous Kosovo Republic within a reformed Yugoslavia. In
September 1990, however, the former Kosovo Assembly proclaimed at
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Kaçanika a "Sovereign Republic of Kosovo." During 18-19 October
1991 the LDK-led parliament declared Kosovo's independence and ap-
pointed Dr. Bujar Bukoshi as Prime Minister of the government in exile.
The KLA: Origins, Aims and Success
Origins
In the spring of 1996 the Liberation Army of Kosova (Ushtria
Çlirimtare e Kosovës, UÇK) became known in the Serbian province of
Kosovo. The rival National Movement for the Liberation of Kosova
{Levizje Kombëtarepër ÇUricim e Kosovës, LKÇK) most likely attacked
Croatian Serb refugees on 11 Feb. 1996.22 Yet the KLA carried out most
actions from then on.23 At a secret meeting in August 1993 the Popular
Movement for the Republic of Kosova (LPRK) under the leadership of
Ibrahim Kelmendi had renamed itself the People's Movement of Kosova
{Lëvizja Popullore ë Kosovë, LPK)24 and shed its Marxist ideology.25
The LPK also established a professional fighting force i.e. the KLA - or
so it claimed.26 A faction from the GMLK 'blood group' broke away
from the People's Movement and became the LKÇK, because it wanted
to remain Marxist-Leninist and urgently realize a Greater Albania.27
The KLA's predecessors kept operating openly in Switzerland and
secretly in Kosovo, engaging in small-scale violence, sabotage and
vandalism. The LPRK approached the militant clan of the Jasharis in the
village of Donji Prekaz in Kosovo's central Drenica region during late
1989 and early 1990. Adem Jashari was the clan's leader; his brother
Hamza and their father Shaban were deputies. They and a few friends
like Sami Lushtaku went to Albania at a secret location to train for
war.28 Whatever else they may have been (criminals, bandits) the mili-
tants appear to have been politically sincere. They also had an example
to live up to: Adem Demaçi, who was finally released in late April 1990
after a total of twenty-eight years in prison especially for founding the
'Revolutionary Movement for Albanian Unity' in 1961. This organiza-
tion reportedly stated in Article 1 of its Statute that "the first and last
objective of our movement is the liberation of the Albanian lands
annexed by Yugoslavia and the incorporation of these areas into the
motherland Albania."29
Yet not all attempts at cooperation succeeded. Bukosbi and LPRK-
leader Xhafer Shatri agreed to jointly train fighters, including former
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policemen and army officers. During 1991 and 1992 a hundred recruits
from Bukoshi's LDK-branch and the Popular Movement trained at
Labinot, Albania, the same place were the Jasharis trained a few years
before. Yet both sides suspected the other of attempting to get control
over most weapons and funds. Many trained LDK- and LPRK-members
were captured in Kosovo. The Serb authorities tried more than hundred
of them, accusing them in September 1993 of belonging to the Popular
Movement or Bukoshi's 'Ministry of Defence and General Staff of the
Republic of Kosova'. Bukoshi's shadow police force in Kosovo ceased
to function by the end of 1994 due to numerous arrests.^o
Aims
The KLA's objectives were simple: liberate Kosovo from the Serb
yoke and make it independent. Some analysts thought that the only sali-
ent divide within the KLA was an extreme rightwing versus an extreme
leftwing. Many Kosovar rebels became enthralled with the WWII
Skanderberg SS division that had consisted of Albanian volunteers.^i
However, nationalism-irredentism issues superseded left-right divisions.
The rightwing clan ofthe Jasharis, one ofthe main KLA factions, simply
hated the Serbs and embraced the early 20th century kaçak (rebel, out-
law) tradition.32 LPK-leaders did contemplate a 'Greater Albania' in the
distant future, but had long since shed the idea of incorporating them-
selves into a Communist Albania. Judah:
these Enverists were not really interested in Enverism, Commu-
nism, Stalinism or any other 'ism'. They wanted to believe that one
day Kosovo would no longer be part of Yugoslavia and... that their
grandchildren might live to see tue day when all Albanians lived in
one 33
Though the LPK managed to keep its grip on the KLA, the latter
never became a unified movement with a single ideology and command
structure. Due to its sudden popularity and growth in 1998 the KLA be-
came a ramshackle collection of political groups and armed formations;
it ceased to be simply the LPK's armed wing. Armed groups claimed to
belong to the KLA. Some did use the name 'UÇK' while never really
belonging to it. We discern at least six factions:
166 East European Quarterly
1. The LPK.
2. The LKÇK which in 1998 had temporarily become KLA's
propaganda mouthpiece and auxiliary force as many of its
members fought alongside or joined the Liberation Army.^ -*
3. Hashim Thaçi (b. 1968) who with other student activists
"joined forces with...the LPK to found the armed movement."35
4. Bujar Bukoshi, premier of the LDK-led exile government who
tried and failed to join forces with the LPRK but whose sup-
porters infiltrated the KLA.36
5. Adem Demaçi, the 'Yugoslav Mandela' who had many
admirers within the KLA and was its spokesman from August
'98 till May '99 when he resigned in protest against the
Rambouillet peace accord.^'
6. The Jasharis, who deflected with LPRK-help a Serb police
attack in 1990 on Donji Prekaz, but perished in a much larger
assault in 1998 that really started the Kosova
Irredentism seems to be the long-term goal. Yet the motivations,
mindsets and ideologies of the rebel movement's founders, commanders
and rank-and-file have been complex, contrasting and contradictory. The
main KLA factions^' reflected these differences. Some militias outside
the 'real' LPK-dominated Liberation Army may have held extreme-right
viewpoints. Some factions, like the Bukoshi-faction, are not unambigu-
ously 'leftist' or 'rightist'.40 Others, especially the Thaçi-faction,
regarded a Greater Albania as an unrealistic dream. The neo-Marxist
LKÇK and rightwing KLA-commanders like Jashari (who had never
lived abroad) were naively convinced that they had embarked "on the
century-long dream of a Greater Albania.'"" Demaçi contemplated until
the end of 1996 a Balkan confederation (Balkanija) made up of Serbia,
Montenegro and Kosovo as equal, 'independent and sovereign' repub-
lics. Yet he ruthlessly supported KLA's attacks against Serb policemen
and Albanian 'collaborators'.''^
Structure
In the early 1990s the KLA was a shakily organized yet closely
knitted group whose commanders were "former commissioned and non-
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commissioned officers of the regular and reserve units of the JNA and
territorial defence units."'*^ The KLA had the potential to form a sizable
outer ring of supporters ready to join the armed struggle: a 1996-1997
CIA report foresaw that the Liberation Army could mobilize tens of
thousands of supporters within two or three years.'''' Indeed, in 1996 the
KLA could muster a few hundred fighters. By the end of 1998 it had
over 17,000 men.''5 The Defence Forces of the Republic Kosova {Forçat
e Armatorsura se Republikës Kosovës, FARK) Bukoshi established in
June 1998 had just 3,000 men, maybe a mere 120 professionals.^^ The
FARK recruited among the 5,000 ethnic Albanians who had volunteered
for the Sarajevo government during the 1992-1995 Bosnian war. Its units
trained in northern Albania during the summer of 1998.'»7 The Defence
Forces sought "to use the organisation skills and superior military
knowledge of its former Yugoslav Army officers to take over the much
larger UÇK.'"*» Yet the Defence Forces were established too late to stem
the influx of recruits and money into the Liberation Army. Still the KLA
was alarmed enough to target FARK members. On 21-22 September
1998 masked gunmen killed Ahmet Krasniqi, the LDK's minister of
defence and supreme commander of the Defence Forces in Tirana. A
few days earlier a KLA communiqué said that "these kind of people will
pay for the damage they have caused our nation.'"" Even after its formal
disbandment a year later the KLA was accused of attacking members of
the LDK and the anti-independence (!) Reform Democratic Party of
Albanians (RDPA).5O
Success
The activation of the KLA marked the start of a serious uprising in
Kosovo. Its arrival utterly transformed the conflict between Serbs and
Albanians. The following seven factors account for the movement's
success.
1. Well-prepared rebellion
The People's Movement patiently prepared a rebellion. Their suc-
cess was not immediately apparent. Until 1996 the rival LKÇK attacked
numerous policemen and 'collaborators', making it the best known
Albanian armed force. The LKÇK under Valon Murati^i had opted for
immediate insurrection, hoping that its fighters would improve through
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action rather than training.52 Yet the latter's envisaged uprising was
premature and amateurish. The LDK's policy of peaceful resistance was
still popular and its parallel institutions worked. The LPK, realizing that
it was too early to challenge Rugova, continued to build its propaganda,
recruitment and alliance networks and finally eclipsed the National
Movement.53
2. Limitations and mistakes bv rivals
When the KLA became active in 1996 the Democratic League
denied its credentials. Rugova, Bukoshi and LDK-deputy chairman
Hydajet Hyseni accused it of being a fake organisation set up by
Belgrade to justify a crackdown and discredit the League. It backfired:
many lost faith in Rugova and the League.^ -» In contrast Demaçi recog-
nized the KLA as a legitimate movement, derided Rugova's parallel
institutions as a "ridiculous caricature of democracy," and called for a
broad front against Serb rule including resort to violence.^s
3. Cheap weaponrv from Albania
Most of Albania's pyramid-fiinds collapsed during early 1997.
People bumed down town halls, police stations and headquarters of the
ruling Democratic Party of Albania (DPA), blaming the government of
President and DPA-leader Sali Berisha for their lost savings. At least
1,800 peopie were killed between Feb. and July alone.56 In an attempt to
deflect attention Berisha called on the Albanians in Kosovo to rise up
against Serbia. The North of Albania remained loyal to Berisha as many
policemen and state employees were recruited from Berisha's native
town Tropoje. The roots of the ex-Communist Socialist Party (SP) lay in
the South. The revolt almost became a civil war between the northern
Ghegs and the southern Tosks.^ ? The Italian-led and OSCE-approved
Operation Alba (Dawn) of 7,000 troops smothered the conflict and
secured new elections on 29 June Berisha's party lost. Between Feb. and
July 1997 around 500,000 Kalashnikovs, 200,000 automatic and half-
automatic guns and 60,000 pistols were looted from Albania's police and
army depots; at least one quarter of the weapons reached the Liberation
Army.58
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4. Effective guerrilla
With the new weapons from Albania the KLA staged its first major
guerrilla operations. On 25-26 November 1997 it ambushed a police
patrol near the village of Llaushe (Lausa), killing two policemen. The
rest fled in their armoured cars to Llaushe, where they killed Albanian
teacher Halit Gecaj. The attendance of three KLA-fighters at the
teacher's funeral on 28 Nov. electrified the 15,000 to 20,000 mourners.
This was the first public appearance of the rebel movement, which sym-
bolically yet firmly confirmed its existence.59 On 4 January 1998 the
KLA announced that its "armed struggle for the liberation of Kosova and
its unification with Albania" h d b ^ o
5. Crackdown sparking large-scale revolt
Alarmed by KLA's stepped-up attacks, Yugoslav President
Milosevic ordered the first massive 'anti-terrorist operation' in Drenica
on 28 Feb. 1998. The Yugoslav Army (Vojska Jugoslavije, VJ), the
Serbian Ministry of Interior's special police (Ministarstvo Unutrasnjih
Poslova, MUP) and its Special Anti-Terrorist Unit (Specijalna Antiteror-
isticka Jedinica, SAJ) had already amassed 50,000 men in Kosovo.* '
Between 28 Feb. and 1 March a battle near Likoshan (Likosan) killed
four Serb policemen and an unknown number of KLA fighters.62
Another four policemen were killed near Glogovac. The brandishing of
the Liberation Army as "without question a terrorist group" by the
United States' special envoy Robert Gelbard on 22 Feb. provided
Milosevic with a carte blancheß^ Special police units encircled a dozen
villages and opened fire with mortars, armoured vehicles and helicop-
ters. During 5-6 March they killed at least fifty people including women
and children at Donji Prekaz. All belonged to the Jashari clan. Adem
Jashari was killed as well. Another extended family was massacred in
Llaushe. The 'Drenica offensive' lasted until late March and killed
eighty Albanians, mostly unarmed civilians.64 More 'anti-terrorist' cam-
paigns followed: between 28 Feb. and 28 Sep. Serb forces killed at least
1,270 Albanians, mostly old men, women and children.65 Albanians felt
their lives in danger; they turned to the KLA to protect them. New
recruits flooded the rebel army.
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6. Learning from mistakes
KLA's overconfident leadership believed its core fighters - well-
trained, well-educated, determined - could conduct conventional warfare
i.e. conquer and hold territory. Thus it occupied Orahovac during 18-19
July. By the end of July Serb forces had recaptured Orahovac, expelling
25,000 people, killing at least sixty-four Albanian civilians and capturing
240 others (they 'disappeared').^^ More KLA strongholds fell, such as
its 'capital' Malisevo on 28 July.67 The Liberation Army overstretched
itself by occupying locations in nearly 40% of Kosovo. It still had only
two thousand professional fighters with no heavy weaponry.6« Only a
heavily-armed rebel army could control territory: "a lightly armed force
which stands against an enormous superiority of tanks, airplanes and ar-
tillery, should better not defend territory, let alone dig trenches and build
bunkers."69 The Liberation Army learned from its mistakes. It appointed
experienced commanders and introduced hierarchical command lines. It
already had introduced "some central authority" during the Serb
onslaught, and it "established training camps, headquarters and military
prisons."''0 The Liberation Army announced on 24 August that it would
revert to "the tactics ofthe classic guerrilla stniggle."''
7. Support from NATO and the West
The Kosova Liberation Army realized that unless it was prepared to
conduct protracted guerrilla warfare Serb forces would not be pushed out
of Kosovo: it was "never able to hold territory, never successfully
defended a town or village, and in the end had to depend on NATO, a
gamble which might not have paid off.'''^  From then on it sought full
NATO intervention that would hasten Serbia's defeat in Kosovo.73
The Serb atrocities forced the intemationai community to consider
stronger measures. Particularly the Americans became sympathetic to
the insurgents and acknowledged their neglect of the Kosovo issue at
Dayton in Nov. 2005 that ended the Bosnian war. Richard Holbrooke
was the first American and Western diplomat to talk openly with KLA-
representatives - writer Lum Haxhiu and jurist Gani Shehum - on June
24 in Junik. This meeting was a spectacular public relations coup for the
rebel army. Holbrooke's arranged meeting between Rugova and
Milosevic on May 15 had no concrete results and sparked criticism and
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defections from the LDK. '^' Moreover, NATO's 'activation order' of 13
Oct. '98 made possible air-strikes if Milosevic kept refusing a dialogue,
humanitarian access and a withdrawal of troops from Kosovo, central
demands in UN Security Council Resolutions 1160 and 1199. The
Holbrooke-Milosevic accord of the same day allowed a 2,000-strong,
unarmed OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo to monitor the reduction
of Yugoslav troops to the level prior to the Drenica offensive. Milosevic
withdrew four-thousand JNA and MUP-personnel just before NATO's
deadline expired on October 27.^ 5 Yet both sides violated the cease-fire
and the alleged massacre of forty-five Albanians in Raçak in Jan. 1999
shocked and angered the West. The Serbs also refiised to sign the
Rambouillet peace agreement on either 23 Feb. or 15 March '99, while
the Albanian delegation did so. On March 24 NATO commenced Oper-
ation Allied Force against Yugoslavia. After NATO had flown 35,219
missions and dropped 23,000 bombs and missiles during some 14,006
attack sorties''^ Milosevic agreed on June to withdraw all forty-thousand
army, police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo.'' On 10 June NATO
suspended its campaign.'» On 13 June the first troops of the 50,000-
strong NATO-led Kosovo Force entered Kosovo. Its Operation Joint
Guardian was meant to aid the safe retum of the 986,000 Kosovar
refligees and secure "public safety and order until the international civil
presence can take responsibility of this task"(UNSC Res. 1244, 9d).'9 By
all appearances the KLA had won a resounding victory 'on the back' of
the world's most powerfiil military alliance.
The third factor of KLA success is perhaps the most important:
without Albania's annus horribilis it would have taken the rebel group
much longer and more money to build a credible fighting force. Yet a
rebellion would have been a matter of time, if only because of the perva-
sive 'gun culture'. By early 1989 Kosovars, presumably of all ethnici-
ties, had permits for 58,612 weapons, mostly guns and rifles. Between
April '81 and April '88 Yugoslav authorities confiscated 4,978 pistols,
1,466 hunting rifles, 427 army rifles, 37 automatic rifles, 7 machine guns
and huge amounts of ammunitions and explosives. These weaponries
were unlicensed and probably presented a tip of the 'arms iceberg' in
Kosovo.*"
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Grievances ofAtbanians in FYR Macedonia
Since the early 1990s, ethnic Albanians in FYR Macedonia have
demanded equal constitutional status for the Albanian language, free use
of symbols, state funding for third level education in the Albanian
language, political and fiscal decentralization, a new census and finally
proportional representation in the public service and the security forces.
The provisions for third level education in Albanian and the free
use of the Albanian language in public institutions and parliament has
been the most contentious issue in FYR Macedonia's post-independence
era and a central demand in the rebel's agenda during the 2001
insurgency. Although the country's constitution provided primary and
secondary education in the Albanian language, third level education was
exclusively practiced in the Slavic Macedonian language.si Of the
27,000 students enrolled in higher education in 1991, only 1.5 percent
were Albanians.*^ This disproportional participation in higiier education
was also the result of higher rates in school drop-outs and conservative
views rural Albanians hold on women pursuing higher education. The
hoisting of the Albanian flag in the town halls of Albanian majority
municipalities brought additional fnction. In 1997, riots broke out in
major cities (Gostivar-Tetovo) for the free use of symbols. The parlia-
ment amended laws concerning ethnic flags before the 2001 crisis,
allowing them to be projected along with the official state flag.
The empowerment of local self-administration, although compati-
ble with European 'subsidiarity' and decentralisation has caused much
scepticism and suspicion. The Albanians traditionally favoured local
self-governance with more powers on fmancing, healthcare and educa-
tion. Throughout the 1990s they accused the Slav Macedonians of
demarcating [redrawing] municipal borders to their electoral advantage.
The one-tier decentralized municipal system was until 1996 an outdated
structure from the socialist era that provided no real competencies. The
Slav Macedonians were afraid that reformulating the municipal system
would encourage Albanian secessionism. The OFA changed the whole
picture as the parties agreed to redraw the municipal boundaries and
increase their autonomy and administrative powers.
The lack of equitable representation for the minorities in the public
services, including army and police has been a source of constant
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frustration. In 1996, the vice director of the National People's Party
Etem Aziri stated that:
In the administration of the parliament only four out of 200
workers are Albanians, in August 1995 only two ethnic Albanians
out of 400 were employed in the Ministry of Labour and Social
Policy and according to Arben Xhaferi head of DPA (the then
PDPA), Albanians make up 1.7 percent of the judiciary, 1.7 percent
of the officers in the armed forces and 2.0 percent of the state
administration.83
The Albanians' poor education, the language barrier, discriminative
practices and reluctance to allow Albanians to hold neuralgic positions
have resulted in extreme under-representation of the Albanians in vital
public and security services. The police and the Ministry of Interior
became symbols of majority control hated by most Albanians who often
confronted the police violently in mass protests. Percentages of Albanian
public employment may slightly vary but there is consensus that Albani-
ans were grossly underrepresented in every public sector. There is also
agreement that employment discrimination üas ultimately led to social
marginalisation and a failure to instill a sense of Albanian patriotism for
the newly independent state.
The issue of equitable representation is related to the controversy
over the number of Albanians residing in FYR Macedonia. According to
the widely accepted and internationally monitored 2002 census the num-
ber of Albanians in FYR Macedonia is 25.17 percent'.«'» The census has
been crucial for the recognition and legitimatizadon of the Albanian
demands. The Albanians have fiercely criticized the exceptionally strict
law on citizenship imposed after independence. They saw it as a deliber-
ate barrier to prevent the naturalization of thousands of Albanians that
have either lived in FYR Macedonia for many years or returned fi-om
abroad. Albanians claimed they are approximately 30 percent of the
population and thus demanded the reformulation of the Constitution's
preamble which until 2001 regarded them as a minority in a state
primarily belonging to the Slav Macedonian ethnicity. The Albanians
saw this as discriminative. They demanded to be seen as equal partners
in a corporate Slav Macedonian and Albanian state.«5 The Constitution
eventually changed, but critics argue that instead of promoting a genuine
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multi-ethnic state the new constitution and all the attendant reforms will
eventually lead towards a bi-national division and fragmentation of the
state.
The NLA: Origins, Aims and Success
Origins
Organized violence against the state was not a new phenomenon for
the security authorities of FYR Macedonia. In early November 1993 the
authorities arrested ten ethnic Albanians for illegal arms trading and for
preparing a rebellion to realize an Independent IUyrida Republic. Deputy
Minister of Defence Hussein Huskaj, one of the PDP {Partia e Prosper-
iteti Demokratike - Party for Democratic Prosperity) representatives in
government, and PDP's secretary-general Midhat Emini were among the
arrested. According to Interior Minister Ljubomir Frckovski the Albani-
an paramilitary force received 600,000 DM from the Albanian Diaspora.
The police seized 300 semi-automatic rifles, thousands of rounds of
ammunition and a list of 21,000 recruits. The short prison sentences for
Huskaj - the suspected leader of the underground army - and the others
in June 1994 temporarily de-escalated the situation, though these sen-
tences still "contributed to the radicalisation of inter-ethnic relations."**
The NLA {Ushtria Çlirimtare Kombetare, UÇK - National Libera-
tion Army) claimed responsibility for sporadic attacks in FYR Macedo-
nia in 1998, 1999 and 2000. Earlier statements implicated the FYR
Macedonian bom leader of the National Movement for Kosovo [LPK]
and KLA founding member FazH Veliu in the case of the "Kicevo
bombers," when small bombs exploded near several police stations in
1998 and 1999.*'' Yet, until 2001 the NLA never really managed to
mobilize much support for a full-scale insurgency and the group's aims
remained widely unknown.
Aims
In January 2001 the so-called NLA initiated a systematic campaign
of armed attacks, which soon escalated into full insurgency across the
country. Contradictory statements by rebel commanders, ranging from
improved community rights to outright secession, suggested strong
factionalism and weak central leadership. The NLA initially heralded an
'alternative route' to those who believed that peaceful debate and reso-
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lution of their grievances has proven fiuitless. By April 2001 the NLA
outlined the same demands as those expressed by the Albanian political
parties: equal status, official status ofthe Albanian language, new census
and higher education in Albanian. Zidas Daskalovski observed that:
At the onset of the conflict, the organizations goals were unclear.
Its communiqués claimed it was fighting against 'Slavo-
Macedonian' oppressors and for a 'Greater Kosovo' or a 'Greater
Albania'. Later the NLA changed its rhetoric and argued that it was
fighting for the human rights of the Albanians in Macedonia and
for constitutional reforms.**
Some analysts feared that frequent remarks of a 'Greater Albania'
and the establishment of territorial control by the NLA indicated seces-
sionism rather than autonomy and equal rights.*' The state authorities
viewed the crisis as a provocation instigated by Kosovar Albanians
boosted by a small number of Albanian ultra-nationalist academics and
politicians within FYR Macedonia.
It is difficult to determine the precise motivation behind the insur-
gency. Yet, the human and financial resources had been carefully
secured and coordinated long before the unfolding of the crisis. Some
local Albanians who felt financially disenfranchised and politically
excluded wished to provoke a speedy political change i.e. reform and
access to political assets and resources. Many of these people associated
with extremist circles in Kosovo and the Albanian Diaspora. Public
frustration with the slow progress made by the DPA (Democratic Party
of Albanians) and the controversial delineation of the border between
Kosovo and FYR Macedonia also played into the militant's hands.
Structure
A mix of KLA veterans and local Macedonian Albanian volunteers
comprised the NLA. Local men and boys were recruited to provide
logistical support, medical help and other administrative tasks and vil-
lagers provided food for the fighters. Diaspora groups linked to localities
provided the funds and expertise to buy and smuggle arms to specific
brigades.90 The NLA leadership resided in Slipkovica, but the real head-
quarters was Prizren in Kosovo. Ali Ahmeti, a Kosovo educated Albani-
an of Macedonian origin acted as the NLA's political representative and
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coordinated activities with ex-KLA commander Ramush Hajredinaj.
Gezim Ostremi, a senior KLA commander who deserted from his chief
of staff post in the Kosovo Protection Forces had taken over as NLA
chief of staff Fazil Veliu, a former editor of a newspaper in Kosovo and
a close friend of the Kosovo's Jashari clan and Emrush Xhemaili who
served as an advisor of Thaci and were also leading figures among the
extremists in FYR Macedonia and Southern Serbia."
It is highly unlikely that the NLA exceeded the 3000 active combat-
ants at its peak.92 A more moderate estimate speaks of 1,000 to 1,200.^ 3
The rebel group probably consisted of at least six brigades. It is doubtful
whether these so-called brigades fiilly submitted to a higher authority.
However, given the post-crisis influx of NLA veterans into Ahmeti's
political party DUI (Bashkimi Demokratik per Integrim - Democratic
Union for Integration), most regional commanders probably paid alle-
giance to Ahmeti. The NLA also attracted a number of mercenaries,
former 'professional' combatants from Kosovo, Bosnia and the Presevo
Valley. The FYR Macedonian security services claim involvement of
Mujahedin fighters from Afghanistan and Pakistan. The mutilation and
desecration of eight soldier's bodies at the Skopje-Tetovo highway
massacre in Aug. 2001 indicated Mujahedin involvement as Albanians
are not known for such cruelties at least up till this point. State security
officials claim that the rest of the NLA comprised of local Albanian
fighters who were paid or forced to participate but this allegation
remains contentious.
Success
L Well-prepared rebellion and effective guerrilla
The NLA formations were lightly equipped and accustomed to the
mountainous and rugged terrain in the north of the country. Battle-
hardened KLA Kosovar fighters, some of them originating from FYR
Macedonia were quick to exploit tensions in bordering villages. The
proximity of Kosovo with FYR Macedonia allowed for escape routes
after the conduct of hit and run attacks. The widespread possession of
small arms in FYR Macedonia made access to weaponry easy but arms
caches in Kosovo supplied the insurgents with additional weaponry. As
in the case of Kosovo, the affluent illegal arms market in Albania also
provided a secure flow of weaponry. Officers from the official Albania
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Army may have also facilitated the transfer of weapons to the rebels.
Weapons held by the NLA include 9M32 Strella-2M, portable surface-
to-air missiles (SAMs), 120mm and 82mm mortars, rocket-propelled
grenades, light anti-tank rockets, 12.7mm heavy machine guns as well as
assorted light machine guns and AK-type assault rifles.94 Same weapons
had been used during the Kosovo conflict. NATO's Operation Essential
Harvest (TFH) collected 3,875 weapons including mortars, anti tank
missiles, machine guns and rifles as well as a large number of mines,
explosives and ammunitions. Yet, state authorities believed the rebels
possessed no less than 50,000 weapons.'^ Similarly to Kosovo's KLA,
initial attacks by the NLA included the bombings of police stations and
the killing of policemen. Exploiting the government's inability to control
certain areas of the national domain, NLA fighters gradually entered into
small isolated mountainous Albanian villages declaring them 'liberated'
and establishing zones of control.
2. Crackdown sparking large-scale revolt
As in the case of Kosovo, the rebels pursued a ruthless retaliation
by the security forces to their provocations. This came in March 2001
after a military offensive against rebel positions around Tetovo. The
clumsy shelling of villages, among which rebels had found shelter, led to
the radicalization of the Albanians. The bombing of rural dwellings and
the political stalemate led to mass demonstrations in all Albanian inhab-
ited cities and the numbers of NLA recruits started to peak. Although the
strategy pursued by the militants was very similar to that of the KLA, the
degree and decisiveness of retaliation was much smaller in scale than
that of the Serbian Army. The Slavic Macedonian forces were ill-
equipped and coordination among the security branches was inadequate.
These deficiencies became evident in the Aracinovo operation (June
2001), where a whole army proved incapable of restoring order in a
village occupied by a few dozens of NLA militants. In Kosovo, the
militants exploited the Serbian Army's fierce crackdown while in FYR
Macedonia rebels manipulated the governmental weakness and military
deficiency.
3. Support fi-om NATO and the West
Less than a year of fighting has brought an unparalleled change for
the FYR Macedonian society and an indisputable success for the insur-
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gents and their supporters. In Kosovo, two years of low-intensity warfare
against the Serb authorities have resulted in equally disproportionate
outcomes, especially when compared to other long standing insurgencies
in Northern Ireland, Kurdistan and the Basque Country. Under that
prism, the Albanians' militant strategy proved successful in both cases.
Political parties in FYR Macedonia attempted to capitalize on the NLA's
success as soon as they realized that many and perhaps most Albanians
sympathized with the rebellion. The NLA correctly grasped the degree
of Albanian deprivation, disaffection and alienation, the weak counter-
insurgency capacity of the state and the catalytic role of the intemational
community. The rebels proved, as has been the case in so many other
armed conflicts that limited but decisive violence can bring about dis-
proportionately significant changes. NATO and the EU condemned the
rebellion but realized that the government was unable to eliminate the
militants. From March 2001, the rebellion attracted renewed inter-
national interest and mediation due to the deteriorating situation in FYR
Macedonia. The political stalemate, coupled with the inability to counter
the rebellion helped to perpetuate violence. From June 2001, the EU's
High Commissioner on Foreign Affairs Xavier Solana and NATO's
Lord Robertson quickly took initiatives for securing a ceasefire and
enabling negotiations.
NATO played a significant political role during and after the
Aracinovo crisis. NATO officials helped to safely evacuate rebels from
the suburb of Aracinovo. This ended a futile confrontation with the
security forces. At the same time, NATO - and the EU special envoys -
offered the necessary guarantees to the Slav Macedonian leadership with
regards to the state's integrity. By August 2001 most Albanian demands
were quickly met and the state was consequently set under international
probation prompting PDP leader Emir Imerit to tell the media that: "If
there were no NLA no one would seriously get involved in dialogue with
the Albanians. The bottom line is that every Albanian in his soul is with
the NLA."96 The political gains were enormous. AH Ahmeti entered
politics as the only reliable 'defender of the Albanians' with the forma-
tion in June 2002 of the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI). The
new party attracted many so-called reformed rebels and won sixteen
seats (11.9 percent / almost 70 percent of the Albanian vote) in the
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September 2002 elections. It became the key partner in implementing the
Ohrid Framework Agreement with SDSM (Social democratic Party of
Macedonia) and the Liberal Democratic Party. For many Slav Macedo-
nians the interference of NATO and the EU was driven by partisan bias
in favor of the Albanians. The KLA managed to attract a NATO-led
military response against Serbia while this did not happen in FYR
Macedonia due to the less difficult conditions on the ground (i.e. the
level and severity of grievances and governmental stubbornness). The
striking similarity, however, lies on the fact that the KLA and the NLA
have both managed to put Kosovo and FYR Macedonia under foreign
probation and control. The KLA succeeded in releasing Kosovo from
Serbian dominance and the NLA succeeded making FYR Macedonia the
state of both Albanians and Slavic Macedonians.
Post-Conflict Grievances and Militant Structures
Current grievances in Kosovo evolve around the question of
independence. In FYR Macedonia, grievances exist with regards to the
meaningful implementation of the Ohrid Agreement. Kosovo Albanians
are eager and uncompromising for independence. However, Kosovar
independence could create a violent backlash among Serbs. By contrast,
keeping Kosovo formally part of Serbia may spark an Albanian uprising
among frustrated Albanians against the United Nations Mission in
Kosovo (UNMIK) and the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The
Contact Group (Troika) and other bodies of the intemational community
face an apparently unsolvable dilemma. In FYR Macedonia, the legali-
zation of Tetovo University and the opening of the multilingual 'Stoel
University''^ helped to overcome the educational deadlock. The Univer-
sity of Tetovo lacks the resources and infrastructure, and since its legali-
zation its educational quality and standards have been criticized. The law
provides for ethnic flags alongside the official state flag on public and
national holidays only. Some Albanian majority municipalities have
ignored this restrictive provision refijsing to remove ethnic flags from
public offices. This practice infuriated the Slav Macedonian community.
New statues portraying historical Albanian heroes such as the grandiose
statue of Skanderbeg in Skopje, the naming of schools after historical
Albanian figures and the inauguration of memorials dedicated to the
fallen NLA and KLA fighters aggravate interethnic elations. The major-
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ity has reluctantly accepted the reforms on decentralisation but new
questions regarding financing, infrastructure, vast municipal debts and
the lack of skilled personnel haunt the post-agreement agenda. Years of
educational exclusion has rendered the Albanians unsuitable for public
administration positions. Moreover, unemployment, perceived corrup-
tion and poverty are major concems in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia.
The stagnancy on Kosovo's independence and the slow-paced reforms in
FYR Macedonia negatively combine with the profound failure to
achieve a meaningful and visible economic and institutional change.
This combination could probably encourage extremists to capitalize on
public frustration. The significant lack of economic prospects is forcing
people to seek for alternatives in organized crime. Except from the grave
economic losses and the threats posed in the well functioning of socie-
ties, organized crime is also responsible for the perpetual militarization
of the Albanian society and the socialization of Üie younger generations
in a climate of crime and machismo.
If the Albanians feel that their hopes are not being fulfilled and if
the moderate forces fail to canalize their grievances by peaceful means
then support for groups such as the ANA (Armata Kombetare Shqiptar,
AKsh - Albanian National Army, ANA> could increase. The Albanian
National Army is believed to be a splinter Albanian militant group
revived by a few die-hard Albanians who seceded from the KLA and the
NLA.98 It is difficult to asses the numerical strength of the so-called
ANA but it is unlikely to have more than a few dozens of active fighters
spread across different countries. Security experts in FYR Macedonia
observe that support for the ANA is near to none and suggest there is no
existing militant structure operating in the country at the moment. By
contrasts, in the same intelligence sources the Serbian authorities claim
the operational forces of ANA in Kosovo and south Serbia are composed
of about 650 terrorists, most of them situated in the region of Kosovska
Kamenica and Gnjilane. Yet, it is more likely that extremist Albanians
opportunistically perpetrate acts of violence under the banner of the
ANA. It is also probable that a serious backlash in Albanian affairs could
re-mobilize many supporters from the Kosovo Protection Forces and the
NLA.99
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Conctusion
To recap, the above analysis attempted to explain the rise, forma-
tion and success of the two major Albanian rebel groups in the Balkans.
Grievances in Kosovo differed from those held by the Albanians in FYR
Macedonia. Kosovo Albanians are more maximal in their political
demands. AU political and militant formations in Kosovo concentrated
on independence. Albanian grievances in FYR Macedonia were mostly
concentrated against a perceived Slavic dominance and discrimination.
Similarly, the aims of the two rebel groups differed. Political manifesta-
tions and fractionalization were significantly more evident among
Kosovo Albanians. However, the two militant organizations were con-
nected to a considerable degree. The organizational structures of the
NLA were heavily influenced by those in Kosovo. Similar weapons were
used in both conflicts. Hit and run attacks in FYR Macedonia involved
escape routes to Kosovo. In terms of their success, the similarities are
striking. Both rebellions provoked a clumsy retaliatory response and
attracted Western attention. However, international approaches towards
the conflicts differed. Former militant personalities became powerful
political figures in both cases. By all means, the two rebellions made
progress possible. The current state of affairs is fluid to the extent that
the major question of Kosovo's independence remains open. Dissatis-
faction with this protracted stalemate may bring reactionary violence.
The Albanians in FYR Macedonia have serious concerns over the
practical application of the reforms. Extremist formations exist in both
national domains, including organized crime gangs. Hence, grievances
and opportunities for mobilization exist. The question therefore concen-
trates on how resistive to violence the Albanians would be.
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